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Foreword 
 This Major Paper is my final deliverable for the Master in Environmental Studies (MES) 
program. My area of concentration is “Co-operatives, Democracy and Sustainability,” and I 
address all of the components to different degrees in this paper. The “democracy” component is 
addressed by asking this question throughout the paper: how deeply are stakeholders involved 
in each stage of the Social Accounting (SA) process? This Paper combines both primary and 
secondary research about Social Accounting and the Ontario co-operatives’ experience 
implementing SA systems. Through the survey and interviews, I wanted to see whether SA was 
demanded by the grassroots membership of co-operatives or if it was a strategic choice by 
leadership. My major learning objective through this paper has been to increase my knowledge 
of Social Accounting systems, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), mostly in the 
context of co-operatives. I have also gained additional insight into the claim that co-operatives 




 Social Accounting is an instrument of measuring organizational performance that takes a 
comprehensive approach (usually including social, environmental and economic factors). 
Conventional financial accounting is increasingly seen as insufficient in revealing the full 
picture of a business’ performance (Mook 22; Mook and Sumner 160). By ignoring negative 
social/environmental externalities, conventional accounting (CA) influences our values and 
behavior – directing our attention only to financial performance and not other factors. Using 
academic literature, I investigate the core issues of conventional and social accounting, and 
especially the latter’s ability to produce genuine sustainability data that is of high quality. The 
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specific SA systems that will be analyzed below are the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and 
the Consumer Co-operative Sustainability and Planning Scorecard. There are serious criticisms, 
which I outline below, of GRI and GRI-like systems as mere management tools intended to 
protect corporate brands. Although SA systems may face credibility issues because, for 
example, they allow high flexibility in terms of material issue selection, it is also true that civil 
society stakeholders have not shown enough interest in using them or trying to make these 
systems more reliable. Co-operative enterprises claim to have broader objectives than just 
financial success, which makes them and Social Accounting apt for each other, according to 
some scholars. Using empirical data from an online survey and in-depth interviews of co-
operatives in Ontario, I explore the obstacles co-operatives face in implementing SA systems, 
which include costs, time requirements, lack of understanding of its benefits, and others.  
 
Introduction  
 This is an era of growing expectation of accountability and transparency from business 
(Brown and Hicks 87). Social Accounting (SA) is a type of accounting that “expands the range 
of criteria taken into consideration when measuring performance in the context of an 
organization’s environment, both social and natural” (Mook 5). Despite Milton Friedman’s 
claim that the only social responsibility of business is to increase profits (Mook 7), the reality 
now is changing towards an expectation of broader business accountability. The number of 
multi-national corporations (MNCs) that are producing sustainability reports is growing, as we 
will see in Section 4 of this paper. The question for this paper is how have the co-operative 
businesses responded to the increasing proliferation of Social Accounting? In theory, the seven 
co-operative principles have placed a wider range of responsibilities on co-operatives than just 
financial success (International Co-operative Alliance). Because of these principles however, 
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co-operatives are perceived to be more sustainable enterprises than conventional businesses 
(Mills and Davies 17), and Social Accounting (SA) is seen as more apt for co-operatives 
(Brown and Hicks 88). But despite this “natural” assumption, my survey results indicate that 
co-operatives have very low Social Accounting implementation rates (see Section 7).  
 More specifically, there are two sets of issues addressed in this paper: one is an 
examination of the problems with established SA theory and practice, and the second is about 
the obstacles faced by businesses, especially co-operative enterprises, in implementing SA. My 
paper is therefore divided into two main parts. Part I provides the context of Social Accounting: 
Problems of conventional accounting (Section 1) and the beginnings of SA (Section 2), 
problems of SA (Section 3), and an in-depth discussion of two examples of SA systems - 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and Consumer Co-operative Sustainability and Planning 
Scorecard (Sections 4,5). Section 3 raises an important fundamental question about SA: who is 
it for and what purpose does it serve? Part II of the paper is an examination of how SA has been 
implemented by co-operatives using a survey (Section 7) and interview (Section 8) results of 
co-operatives in Ontario about the obstacles they face in this implementation. Section 6 features 
an examination of the philosophical fit between co-operatives and SA, followed by an outline 
of obstacles to SA implementation in co-operatives based on the academic literature on the 
subject.  
 
Part I: Context: Traditional Accounting, Social Accounting and  
Their Problems 
 
1. What’s Wrong With Conventional Accounting? 
 It is appropriate to start a session on social accounting by defining conventional 
accounting (CA). It is the “process of identifying, gathering, measuring, summarizing, and 
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analyzing financial data in order to support economic decision-making (Mook 5).  
Conventional accounting is based mostly in the interests of the owners of capital (i.e. 
shareholders) and ignores the interests of other stakeholders who do not participate in the 
profitability of the organization. What is a stakeholder? Stakeholders can be defined broadly or 
narrowly (Rinaldi, Unerman, and Tilt 86). A broad definition: 
Individuals or groups within society that are very close to the organization along 
with others that are very remote from the organization (and could even include 
future generations and nature) all of whose life experiences and interests are 
impacted in some way by the organization’s operations, policies and/or practices. 
(Ibid 86). 
 
A narrow definition would only include those entities that are close to the organization in 
terms of having the strongest ability to affect the success of its operations by their 
decisions (Rinaldi, Unerman, and Tilt 86-87). For example, narrowly defined 
stakeholders would include employees, shareholders and customers. 
 Conventional accounting (CA) has been influenced in its focus on profit by the 
neoclassical economic theory more than by any other theory (Collison, Ferguson, and 
Stevenson 32). Consequently, according to Collison, Ferguson, and Stevenson, CA is guided by 
values and beliefs that help maintain relations of domination. Specifically, the economic rights 
of shareholders are treated as innately superior, while negative impacts of their actions are 
treated as externalities to be ignored as much as possible (33). The owners of capital use all 
tools at their disposal, including lobbying and propaganda, to resist the internalization of 
externalities (i.e. social, environmental costs on other stakeholders into their “bottom line” 
(Collison, Ferguson, and Stevenson 33). Externalities can be defined as “factors not included in 
traditional forms of accounting that affect human well-being; the (usually) unintended 
consequences of doing business. Negative externalities include pollution” (Mook and Sumner 
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175). In this way, conventional accounting is a political and value-laden process designed to 
serve primarily the interests of capital owners and to suppress the interests of everybody else 
who are affected by the operations of the business. Conventional accounting asks this question: 
“how can we maximize profit for our owners?” (Mook 17). “Technical rationality” and 
“scientific-sounding abstractions” within the field of accounting help disguise the real ideology 
underneath, leading its students towards ignorance of moral problems embedded in 
conventional accounting (Collison, Ferguson, and Stevenson 33).  
 The first criticisms of conventional accounting practices emerged in the 1960s and 1970s 
when critics pointed out that it creates, sustains and may even change social reality, as opposed 
to just objectively reflecting it (Mook 6). The claim that what we place importance on and 
measure in society affect our reality and even ourselves is echoed by Dirk Philipsen, the author 
of “the Little Big Number.” In it, he explains how our faith in GDP as a barometer of prosperity 
has blinded us to everything else that it does not measure (6). Focusing merely on GDP, just 
like reporting only on financial information as a measure of performance, limits what we strive 
for, because what we don’t measure becomes secondary or ignored completely. As Philipsen 
argues, we “become what we measure” (1). It means that the goals that we strive to achieve and 
measure ourselves against become part of our values. For example, when GDP growth is held 
as a highest goal for a national economy while it produces depletion of resources, climate 
change, erosion of communities and so on; we end up tolerating these sustainability issues as 
necessary costs of economic development – we become blind to their impacts which leads to 
our current environmental crisis. “Choices about what to count, and how to count it, define 
many of our core values” (Philipsen 5). In other words, we become less healthy as a society, 
but we accept it for the ultimate goal of higher GDP. GDP measures the totality of goods and 
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services produced in an economy, but is that all we want from our economy? GDP is a blind 
meter: it counts only output; it ignores costs and losses” (Philipsen 3). Likewise, conventional 
accounting is missing a big chunk of the story when analyzing the performance of an 
organization.  
 Critical accounting emerged from this criticism that conventional accounting 
creates/changes social reality. Critical accounting seeks to not only understand the world but to 
change it as well. However, according to Mook, critical accounting theorists most often do not 
advocate for any alternative models that would better address social, economic and 
environmental issues (6).  
 Social Accounting, a third approach, is intended to fill that gap in critical accounting and 
“provide accountants with working strategies and tools that challenge traditional accounting 
practices” (Mook 6). In contrast to the question that conventional accounting asks, SA is 
preoccupied with this: “what difference do our actions make in economic, social and 
environmental terms?” (Mook 17). Social Accounting is based on mostly the same criticisms of 
conventional accounting, but aims to “provide a working framework that takes into 
consideration a broader range of factors and actors in the accounting process” (Mook 7). This 
paper will now turn to Social Accounting to discuss exactly how SA achieves these broader 
goals. 
  
2. What Is Social Accounting and Why Do We Need It?  
 If organizations are claiming to increasingly measure themselves up against the standards 
of sustainability, first it is essential to know what those standards entail. In this section, I will 
explore various ways that sustainability/sustainable development and Social Accounting are 
conceptualized and why there is a need for the latter. Sustainability or sustainable development 
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is a contested term that is interpreted in different ways (Dresner 69-70). Businesses use 
sustainability reports to “choose the meaning and implications of sustainable development, 
thereby mitigating its (i.e. sustainable development’s) power to change the status quo” 
(Azcarate et al. 215). Sustainability reporting initiatives however, can be used to promote the 
managerial capture of the concept of sustainable development because reporting companies can 
choose whichever initiative they prefer to use and to what extent. Sustainability reporting is, 
after all, voluntary (Azcarate et al. 215), in most instances. There are some commonly agreed 
upon definitions of sustainability, however. For example, the World Commission on the 
Environment and Development (WCED) gave the most frequently used definition of 
sustainable development in 1987: “development which meets the needs of the present without 
sacrificing the ability of future generations to meet their needs” (Bebbington et al. 3). The issue 
becomes what does this mean practically as this definition is quite vague and frequently 
contested (Mook and Sumner 157). For example, what is a “need” (Dresner 73-74)? Is it about 
human development or economic growth? Perhaps a more helpful definition of sustainability is 
based on a concept of civil commons. Civil commons is “any co-operative human construct 
that protects and/or enables the universal access to life goods” (Mook and Sumner 158). Life 
goods include such things as clean air, healthy food, education, human rights and so on. It 
would not include destructive goods such as junk food, violent entertainment and weapons 
(Mook and Sumner 158). In broad terms, “an organization would be considered more 
sustainable the more it addresses all three sets of life goods (environmental, social and 
economic) (Mook and Sumner 159). In the long term, if a community has a universal access to 
life goods, it is sustainable. 
 Considering the above sustainability definitions, Social/Sustainability Accounting 
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attempts to account for how well the present and future generations’ needs are met or how well 
a universal access to life goods is ensured. SA is a broad term that brings together a variety of 
alternative accounting models such as expanded value added accounting, environmental 
accounting, and sustainability accounting (Mook 7; Mook and Sumner 159). More precisely, it 
is “a systematic analysis of the effects of an organization on its communities of interest or 
stakeholders, with stakeholder input as part of the data that are analyzed for the accounting 
statement” (Mook and Sumner 175). Sustainability reporting communication “might be in a 
stand-alone report or it might be part of an annual report, inside or outside of the audited 
financial statements and/or inside or outside of the management discussion and analysis,” print 
advertisements, press releases, securities filings, employee newsletters, and corporate websites 
(Buhr et al. 53). This breadth of reporting methods is one of the strengths of SA, and allows 
stakeholders to participate in a number of ways. SA is a response to the perceived flaws of 
conventional accounting practices (Mook 6-7) and is a form of civil-private regulation. Civil-
private regulation refers to the use of information that “empowers and mobilizes societal actors 
to demand accountability and certain performance from companies” (Brown et al. 572). Social 
Accounting is also a field of research concerned with accounting of the broader impacts of 
organizations on their stakeholders than just financial impacts on the organization’s owners” 
(Mook and Sumner 175). In short, SA attempts to be more socially valuable by serving a wider 
range of organizational stakeholders.  
We know what the purpose of SA is in abstract, but is that the primary motivation for 
adopting it? The short answer is that different stakeholders may be using SA for different 
purposes. Outside stakeholders of business (i.e. civil society) need SA because it can be a tool 
for encouraging more sustainable behaviour by rendering the costs of doing business (i.e. 
	   	  Ragainis	  11	  
externalities) more transparent (Mook and Sumner 173). In turn, access to this information 
makes it more likely that an organization will be held accountable for the costs it created for the 
stakeholders. The expectation then is that the negative externalities would be avoided in the 
future. But what do inside stakeholders - business owners and management, need SA for? 
Various authors have described businesses’ motivations for reporting on their sustainability 
impacts as a “response to external demands for transparency and accountability,” as a 
“recognition of a moral duty to assess and report on social and environmental impacts,” and/or 
as “desirable for instrumental reasons summed up as ‘business case’” (in Brown and Hicks 87). 
According to Buhr et al., organizations are “always driven, to one degree or another, by the 
immediate and strategic objectives of the corporation” (59). Reporting is done at least in part, 
in response to various pressures, expectations and social change. Reporting corporations 
respond and contribute to public opinion about the impacts of their operations. Buhr et al. 
provide a whole list of potential rationales for sustainability reporting: 
1. Moral and ethical reasons, duty 
2. Competitive advantage  
3. Party to setting of voluntary standards GRI, IIRC 
4. Party to setting of mandatory standards – government, accounting or securities based 
5. Peer and industry pressure 
6. Corporate performance  
7. Image management, public relations, corporate reporting awards 
8. Social pressures, social license to operate, 
9. Financial benefits of from investor reactions 
10. Existing regulation – government, accounting or securities based (61-62). 
 
In a study of motivations for reporting using GRI, MNCs have responded that reputation and 
brand protection were key motivations (Brown et al. 573). This is certainly not the goal that 
civil society stakeholders have; they would rather SA serve the purpose of accountability to 
them. The differing objectives among the stakeholders for the business’ use of SA poses 
dangers to the integrity of SA processes, which are discussed in more detail in Section 3. 
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3. Problems with Social Accounting   
 The theory of making change through Social Accounting goes like this: assuming the 
measured and reported sustainability impacts are accurate, then stakeholders, especially civil 
society, NGOs, organized labor, activists and so on, can use that information to press 
government to pass/change laws to address unsustainability (Buhr et al. 59). Civil society may 
also engage in consumer activism and refuse to buy goods/services from unsustainable 
businesses. Another possible way that change towards sustainability could happen is if 
businesses competed based on sustainability performance that’s in the sustainability reports 
(Brown et al. 572). Good performers may get awards, which would supposedly boost their 
reputation versus their competitors (Brown et al. 578). The possibility of such competition 
happening will be discussed in Section 4. So this civil-private regulation tool is supposed to be 
more effective than “rigid and inefficient” command and control government approach of 
enforcing sustainable practices (Brown et al. 571-2). In this section, three main threats to the 
reliability of Social Accounting will be discussed: the possibility that SA systems are not 
measuring genuine sustainability, the integrity of external assurance, and the possibility that SA 
is just covering the inherent unsustainability of capitalism. In addition, the question of “who is 
SA (really) for and what purpose does it serve?” will be tackled. 
 First, let’s consider the potential of SA to produce genuine sustainability data for 
stakeholders. One of the fundamental questions about SA as it is practiced today is whether the 
systems we use measure and report genuine sustainability (Buhr et al. 51). The following 
paragraphs will provide a description of what is meant by “genuine” sustainability. Azcarate et 
al. claim that the sustainability accounting systems that are currently used to demonstrate 
sustainability or lack thereof, are not adequate and do not constitute genuine sustainability 
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reporting (215; Buhr et al. 51). Azcarate el al. have investigated the sustainability indicators 
and how well do they fit the concept of sustainable development. In short, the social, 
environmental and economic indicators (also known as TBL – triple bottom line) that are 
provided in most sustainability reports may be necessary but are not sufficient to report on 
genuine (un)sustainability of an organization (Azcarate et al. 216). It would not be a sufficient 
amount of information because a reporting organization must link its impacts to the state of the 
environment (Azcarate et al. 216-17). That is because the concept of sustainable development 
implies a state of the environment that would satisfy all the life needs of the future generations. 
The current sustainability accounting initiatives do not require businesses to relate their 
individual performance to the macro level of the environment (Azcarate et al. 216). Yet, 
genuine sustainability accounting would require a broader ecosystems-based approach, that is, 
“an understanding of cumulative environmental change and assessments of the cumulative 
effects of economic activity” (Buhr et al. 51). Reporting simply on the triple bottom line (TBL) 
indicators grossly oversimplifies the concept of sustainable development and there is an 
inevitable gap between corporate performance and corporate impacts (Moneva et al. 122). 
 To illustrate Azcarate et al.’s and Buhr et al.’s point about the flawed perception of 
sustainability indicators that is prevalent, consider the following example. Reporting on how 
much water a business has used in a given reporting year does not tell us anything about the 
adequacy of the water resources for the future generations in that area, whether they are 
diminishing and whether it was the responsibility of a particular business for creating a less 
sustainable access to water for the future generations’ needs. Basically, it needs to also provide 
a context in terms of how much its water withdrawal took away from the sustainability of the 
natural environment. This step would be a shift to taking a more direct responsibility for the 
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environment’s wellbeing and not just the immediate impacts of the business. As Buhr et al. 
explain it, (genuine) sustainability accounting requires “a detailed and complex analysis of the 
organization’s interactions with ecological systems, resources, habitats, and societies, and 
interpret this in the light of all other organizations’ past and present impacts on those same 
systems” (51). They rightfully admit that for any single organization, providing all this 
information would be “technically impossible.” This view is summed up like this: it is 
impossible for organizations to “go beyond approximate accounts of unsustainability and to 
fully and fairly report on corporate activity as it relates to the pressures on, the state of, and the 
future capacity of life-sustaining ecological systems, and inter- and intra-generational access to 
them” (Buhr et al. 52).  While it seems to be impossible for organizations to report on their 
genuine sustainability, it does not mean that triple-bottom line (TBL) reporting, which is what 
most sustainability reporting amounts to today, is useless. Nevertheless, it is important to know 
the limitations of TBL or un-genuine sustainability reporting. 
 Another side of the above issue is the inadequacy of the chosen indicators that are 
supposed to constitute social and/or environmental accountability (Buhr et al. 63). Despite the 
success of rapidly increasing rates of voluntary reporting, typically guided by the GRI, the 
sustainability reporting has been a “heroic” failure in a sense that it fails in its purpose of 
holding organizations accountable for their impacts on stakeholders, especially broadly defined 
ones (Buhr et al. 63-64). More specifically, they fail to give adequate insights into the TBL 
impacts to the stakeholders. GRI and GRI-inspired reporting guidelines’ developers have not 
agreed on a full set of indicators that together might reasonably ensure a social and/or 
environmental accountability to the stakeholders (Buhr et al. 63). This is not even about 
accountability against sustainability objectives, but basic social, economic and environmental 
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reporting. Buhr et al. are especially critical of the social and environmental indicators, while 
calling environmental indicators “helpful” (i.e. better at demonstrating genuine performance). 
The bottom line is this: even if an organization’s TBL report is fully GRI-compliant, it does not 
mean that any substantial accountability is being discharged or that the audience of the report is 
able to accurately identify its triple bottom line (TBL) performance (Buhr et al. 64). The 
flexibility and voluntariness of GRI and GRI-inspired TBL guidelines cause this 
ineffectiveness (Buhr et al. 63). With voluntary reporting, organizations can choose what 
indicators to report on and ignore others, potentially hiding large impacts.  
 The second danger to the reliability of SA process, reporting being an important 
component, is the issues with independent verification or assurance of sustainability reports 
(Buhr et al. 64). To start, independent assurance of sustainability reports is still rare (only about 
25% are assured) and when it exists, it is hardly trustworthy (in Buhr et al. 64). If sustainability 
reports are to be trusted as authoritative sources of information that stakeholders can rely on, 
how is it acceptable to not have mandatory third-party assurance, like financial statements have 
to get? According to Laufer, it is next to impossible to judge how accurate businesses’ reports 
are without external, third party verification and monitoring (257). Besides, external assurance 
is relatively cheap: a study by Park and Brorson (2005) found that the costs are between 4% 
and 6% of those for the financial audit (Cooper and Owen 78-9). At this point, external 
assurance of sustainability reports is still mostly a large company phenomenon (Cooper and 
Owen 72). However, in a 2011 KPMG’s triennial International Survey of Corporate 
Responsibility Reporting by both the top 250 of the Fortune 500 companies (G250) and the top 
100 companies from 34 countries, indicate that the practice continues to grow, but the rate of 
growth is slowing down significantly. What could be the obstacles towards a wider provision of 
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external assurance of sustainability reports? The first wave of assurance providers (1990s) 
faced an absence of any clear guidelines for the adopted approach of assurance. In recent years 
this issue has been alleviated by the issuance of sustainability assurance practice guidelines in 
two categories. The first one is “accountancy” based approach of the Federation des Experts 
Comptables Europeens and the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB), “which are largely concerned with attesting the accuracy of published data and 
minimizing the liability of the assuror” (Cooper and Owen 75). The most influential assurance 
standard in this category, IAASB’s International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 
3000, also does not put much emphasis on the “relevance of such data for external stakeholder 
groups (Cooper and Owen 77). The second category is the AccountAbility series of assurance 
standards, “where the issue of stakeholder engagement is absolutely central to the assurance 
process.” Despite the issuing of the above-mentioned assurance guidelines, studies have found 
a “great deal of ambiguity and variability inherent in practice, with particular reservations being 
expressed concerning its efficacy in enhancing corporate transparency and accountability to 
stakeholder groups” (Cooper and Owen 78). CPA Australia (2004) study’s authors conclude 
that the readers of the report would “often have great uncertainty in understanding how the 
assurance provider undertook the engagement, what they reviewed and what was the meaning 
of their conclusion” (Cooper and Owen 78). O’Dwyer and Owen, in their 2005 study of 
assurance statements, point out that a large degree of management control remains over the 
whole process. In addition, management appoints assurance providers and it can place any 
restrictions on the exercise (Cooper and Owen 78).  
 A temptation by assurance providers to also provide consulting services is another issue 
with external assurance. The assurance statements that have been provided by non-“big 4” 
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accounting firms (i.e. not Ernst & Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, and Deloitte) are 
much more likely to include recommendations for improvement than those provided by the big 
4 accounting firms (Cooper and Owen 79). Where assurance statements include recommended 
areas of improvement, a danger arises in combining “what is essentially a consultancy function 
with a separate, ‘arm’s length’ assurance exercise”, because this may compromise the integrity 
of the latter (Cooper and Owen 79).  
“Once social accounting and auditing moves away from the focus on ‘holding the 
organization to account’, a fundamental principle of the early pioneers of external 
social auditing practice (see, for example, Medawar, 1976), they run the risk of 
being confined largely as mere management tools rather than as mechanisms for 
promoting democratic accountability” (Cooper and Owen 79).  
 
But even if that accounting firm only provided an assurance, there is a fundamental question 
about the extent to which assurance provider can hold organizations accountable when they are 
being paid by them to do the assurance. On the one hand, assurors would not want to provide 
undeservedly favorable assurance statements to not lose their reputation as having integrity; but 
on the other hand, they want to help the organizations look better, such as including praise for 
the organizations’ achievements within the assurance statements (Cooper and Owen 79). It 
probably pleases the organization hiring the assuror, but weakens the perception of 
independence of the assurance provider. Interviews with corporate managers have confirmed 
that they expect the assurance process to bring value for the company (Cooper and Owen 80). 
While the assurance practitioners admitted that given the voluntary nature of assurance, first 
they need to “demonstrate that their service will provide benefits to their clients through 
improved systems and increased credibility” (Cooper and Owen 81). So the real driving force 
behind seeking external assurance is internal. Therefore, the conflict of incentives/interest may 
cause assurance providers to harm the integrity of the assurance they are giving. 
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 A crucial issue for external assurance and the whole purpose of SA is the level of 
engagement of stakeholders. This especially applies to outside stakeholders who are rarely 
interviewed (Cooper and Owen 78). Stakeholders are seen as a disengaged group in the 
sustainability report assurance process that does not read the assurance statements (Cooper and 
Owen 80, 82). Perhaps because of that, stakeholder inclusion is most often indirect in nature. 
Stakeholder panels were suggested as a good way to increase stakeholder engagement, but the 
challenge is in making them representative of a wide range of stakeholder views. A fair 
question may be asked: if stakeholders want reporting organizations to be accountable to them, 
why are they not more active by at least reading sustainability reports and their assurance 
statements? But a good follow-up question to that is: does stakeholder input mean anything in 
terms of its potential to make changes to the assurance process? There have been a few cases of 
stakeholder panels implemented, such as by National Grind and BT (Cooper and Owen 82). In 
those cases, corporate management appointed the external participants, instead of the 
stakeholder groups themselves. Thus, these external participants represented and were 
accountable only to themselves, which is not representative of the stakeholder body as a whole. 
But in cases where stakeholder groups do have direct representation, they are “confined to 
consultative committee-type structures, completely separated from key strategic decision-
making areas” (Cooper and Owen 82). The issue of stakeholder involvement in assurance or 
even the TBL reporting is about power sharing. Unsurprisingly, neither management, nor 
assurors are contemplating any transfer of power to stakeholders in a way that would enable 
stakeholders to hold businesses accountable for their activities and demand any degree of 
responsiveness to their concerns (Cooper and Owen 82). One possible way to transfer some 
power over the assurance process is to enable stakeholders to appoint assurance providers and 
	   	  Ragainis	  19	  
to determine the scope of the exercise. This has not been applied in practice, but even if it had, 
there would still be no way in which stakeholders could influence organizational decision-
making by using assurance findings (Cooper and Owen 82). Stakeholder power is nowhere near 
as broad as shareholder power. On the other hand, reconciling different points of view from a 
variety of stakeholders, such as investors, organized labor leaders, NGOs’ representatives, may 
also be difficult in an assurance engagement exercise. For example, a labor leader who was 
interviewed had doubts about the legitimacy of the whole assurance industry, and the investor 
was not sure about the use of assurance for their decision-making (Cooper and Owen 80). NGO 
representatives, on the other hand, were willing to be part of the assurance process but were 
worried about the impact of their participation on their independence. Assurors had a 
significant concern: managerial control of the assurance process means that ‘stakeholder 
inclusivity is inevitably driven by management, with benefits to stakeholders perhaps viewed as 
a useful by-product” (Cooper and Owen 81). This, again, shows how assurance process is 
controlled by those who do not intend it to be about accountability to stakeholders, although 
assurors have claimed that assurance provides benefits for both sides: company’s management 
and its other stakeholders (Cooper and Owen 80-81).   
 To summarize the problems of assurance that I just discussed: the assurance providers’ 
(most notably, professional accounting firms) unwillingness, or inability to provide higher 
levels of assurance; managerial control of the assurance process; and limited levels of 
stakeholder engagement. Part of the reason for the disinterest lies in the fact that SA is not a 
reliable enough source of information; otherwise NGOs would not expend their own resources 
trying to track down the negative impacts of big business, if they could find them in SA reports. 
Ultimately, both, the stakeholders and the assurors/management need to do more to make 
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stakeholder involvement in the assurance process meaningful. Stakeholders need to be more 
active and assurers/management need to allow input that makes a real difference in meeting 
stakeholder needs. But the main driver for this change has to be stakeholders themselves; it is 
very unlikely that business management, whose interest in assurance and stakeholder 
engagement is based on improving financial value (Cooper and Owen 82), will adjust assurance 
process to address stakeholders’ interests better.  
 The third challenge to the reliability of SA as a tool to help business advance towards 
sustainability is more of a philosophical one. Members of an alternative school of accounting, 
critical accountants, have criticized SA as a tool that helps mislead people about the possibility 
that capitalist organizations can ever become sustainable (Mook 7). Social Accounting is 
sometimes accused by the proponents of critical accounting of legitimizing the (unsustainable) 
status quo, of not questioning the role that capitalism plays in exploitative social relations, and 
of creating an illusion that progress toward sustainability can be made by corporations. The 
problem with the social accounting approaches, according to critical accountants, is that they 
can “stall the construction of more critical and interpretive models” (Mook 7). Basically, the 
current form of capitalism is not, and will not, be sustainable and social accounting cannot 
change that. That is a reasonable point to make about the capitalist economic system, but SA’s 
aim is to make those impacts visible, if it is true. Mook replies that critical accounting is not 
offering real alternatives and that social accountants have the ability to create more democratic, 
transparent and participatory accounting practices aimed at creating social change. I would 
argue that if SA produces reliable and relevant information and democratizes the accounting 
process, it would be a serious challenge to the capitalist way of operating business. If 
shareholders are suddenly not the only interest group entitled to information and a power to act 
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on that information, then capital owners’ power (and indeed capitalism itself) is being 
challenged. After the accusation of critical accountants that SA is a tool that maintains an 
unsustainable status quo of the capitalist system, Mook responded that SA can be applied to 
any social system, “it is not strictly a capitalist project” (7). In other words, Social Accounting 
would be valuable for progressive change and the empowerment of stakeholders in any socio-
economic system; it is not just a tool of reformist change that helps maintain capitalism.  
 Perhaps because of the above issues, there is little outside stakeholder interest in SA as a 
tool for civil regulation or accountability (Cooper and Owen 81). Civil society organizations, 
including social activists, NGOs, media, consumer organizations, organized labor and so on, do 
not rely on the GRI reports in their tactics (Brown et al. 575). If stakeholders, to whom the 
accountability is supposed to be discharged and who are expected to use the information to 
advocate for greater sustainability do not pay attention to the reports; who is SA for and what 
purpose does it serve? Given that SA is not used as a tool of accountability by the civil society, 
and the words of multi-national corporations (MNCs) that use GRI themselves (Brown et al 
573), SA is primarily a tool for improving business reputation and brand protection (i.e. 
“business case”). The main users of SA today by far are large businesses (Brown et al. 574, 
577), although in theory Social Accounting should be useful for a wide variety of organizations 
and stakeholders (Mook 5,7-9). But it is clear that various stakeholders see the utility of SA 
very differently (Brown et al. 575-6).  
 While SA may have a vision to democratize accounting, critical accountants’ skepticism 
may still be proven correct if SA does not give a broader range of stakeholders the power to 
challenge the supremacy of profit over sustainability objectives. Even if SA provided reliable 
and relevant information to account for the sustainability impacts, there is still no practical way 
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in which stakeholders could democratically defend their interests within private businesses at 
this point. Information is in itself a certain degree of power (to the extent that it is reliable and 
relevant according to stakeholders), but real democracy also requires that eligible “voters” (i.e. 
stakeholders) can use it to control activities that affect them in a way that gives every 
stakeholder a say. Is SA up for the task of giving stakeholders of business activity a bigger 
voice in an economy where capital owners’ profit priorities rule?  
  
4. Conventional Social Accounting System: Global Reporting Initiative 
 I refer to “conventional SA systems” as Social Accounting systems/guidelines that are 
intended primarily for conventional businesses. Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) has been no 
doubt the most influential set of guidelines globally (Buhr et al. 62). GRI is “the best known 
framework for voluntary reporting of environmental and social performance by business 
worldwide (Brown et al. 571). It was founded in 1997 in Boston by two US non-profit 
organizations: the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) and the 
Tellus Institute (GRI, “GRI’s History”). G4 is the fourth generation of sustainability reporting 
guidelines that are composed of general standard disclosures and specific standard disclosures 
(GRI, “G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines,” 20). As part of the latter, there are three 
categories of indicators: social (48 indicators), environmental (34) and economic (9) (GRI, “G4 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines,” 22-23).   
 In Canada, large co-operatives, such as Desjardins, VanCity, The Co-operators, also 
report using GRI Guidelines (Leclerc et al. 141). According to Brown et al., the majority of 
large multinational companies in Europe and the US produce sustainability reports as of 2005, 
GRI or otherwise (577). 95% of the world’s 250 largest companies produced sustainability 
reports in 2011 (Buhr et al. 56). Smaller companies have lower reporting rates, but they still 
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grew over the last years. Most reporters are big corporations in the sectors of: utilities, oil and 
gas, banking, automotive industry, mining, chemicals and synthetics, forestry and paper 
(Brown et al. 574). Barely any SMEs (small and medium enterprises) reported by 2006. This 
section will include an overview of GRI’s founding vision and evolving purpose, principles, 
structure, and its potential of acting as a tool of accountability for business stakeholders. 
 GRI’s funders and developers have influenced its development in their own interests. 
GRI’s most dominant constituencies have led the evolution of GRI guidelines towards their 
interests and ways of thinking (Brown et al. 579). The most active and influential actors in the 
GRI’s organizational field are multi-national corporations (MNCs), leading accountancies and 
international consultancies, followed by UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) and 
idea entrepreneurs (Brown et al. 577). GRI Secretariat, its governing organization, was initially 
funded by charitable foundations but now relies mostly on private sources (Brown et al. 576). 
Its initial vision of providing a public good without relying on public, but only private funds, 
put the Secretariat in a tense situation. Now it is increasingly dependent on money from big 
companies and banks, which undermines the perception of impartiality (Brown et al. 576). 
Large corporations are key players among GRI reporters and verifiers, and have played an 
active role in developing and promoting GRI. The participation of civil society organizations 
such as NGOs and organized labor has been low and declining (Brown et al. 573). The reasons 
Brown et al. mention being partly resource constraints (NGOs) and limited interest. SMEs have 
been even less visible in the GRI field. GRI Secretariat, its governing body, describes the 
guidelines’ function in this way: 
[it]…provides tools for: management, increased comparability and reduced costs of 
sustainability, brand and reputation enhancement, differentiation in the 
marketplace, protection from brand erosion resulting from the actions of suppliers 
or competitors, networking and communications…provides the private sector with 
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a vehicle to better inform capital market decision makers and analysts to ensure 
stakeholder value (Brown et al. 578). 
 
Interestingly, in the end of the quote the Secretariat says that, in essence, it would be the capital 
market decision-makers who would ensure there is “stakeholder value” using GRI reports. So 
this is not about empowering stakeholders themselves to ensure that value. We will doubtfully 
move ahead in sustainability if our fate is only in the hands of investors. This quote gives more 
credence to the idea that GRI guidelines are a mere “administrative reform that is insufficient to 
enable new accountability relationships” (Moneva et al. 122). Perhaps because of the latter, one 
explanation for the wide proliferation of GRI standards is that it did not threaten to upset the 
power balance between shareholders, corporate management and the broader stakeholders 
(Levy et al. 111). 
GRI would never have made any progress had it directly challenged the primacy of 
profit maximization, the legal rights of shareholders, the autonomy of corporate 
management, or the conventional US corporate board structure that excludes 
representatives of the community, the environment, or labor (Ibid.). 
 
GRI’s instrumental value as a tool for civil-private regulation through market mechanisms has 
been modest (Brown et al. 579). Although GRI is an emerging institution, it has not resulted in 
the generation of data that is of high and consistent quality that is easily comparable across 
companies (Brown et al. 578). One of the assumptions that shaped GRI was the idea that 
standardized information that could be used for benchmarking and comparability would be a 
powerful tool for action for political actors and market-based mechanisms for change (Brown 
et al. 572). The information-based approach to regulation was seen as an alternative to 
command and control approach through governments (Brown et al. 572). But GRI has not 
stimulated the emergence of a community of financial, labor, civil rights, environmental or 
consumer activists for whom using the GRI reports to achieve change would be a standard 
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practice (Brown et al. 578). The target audiences of GRI, which include investors and 
employees, showed little interest in the reports, and civil society organizations showed even 
less interest (Brown et al. 574). GRI has always been concerned by low use of sustainability 
reports by civil society organizations such as media and activists (Brown et al. 575). Who is 
responsible for this disengagement by the civil society? Part of the blame may be assigned to 
both, GRI developers and civil society stakeholders themselves. 
   Part of the blame goes to the initial strategy of GRI’s founders who wanted to build a new 
institution without posing a direct challenge to existing institutions of corporate governance, 
including managerial boards and financial market structures (Brown et al. 579). Why would 
civil society stakeholders be interested in an institution that does not give them any power? In 
turn, low readership and feedback from stakeholders is the primary reason companies do not 
compete based on sustainability reports (Brown et al. 574). They do not even read each other’s 
reports. The competitive pressure to issue the reports and be accountable for their content is 
absent (Brown et al. 578). Some companies are even considering shifting to bi-annual reports 
or writing shorter ones because of the lack of interest (Brown et al. 574). GRI expected that the 
institutional logic of “civil regulation” could be complimentary with another logic of “corporate 
social performance,” which emphasizes GRI’s instrumental value to corporate management, 
investor community, and auditing and consulting firms (Brown et al. 579). Following the latter 
logic, GRI could also serve the interests of progressive companies that would gain competitive 
advantage over companies that are not as socially/environmentally responsible (Brown et al. 
572). The progressive companies would ideally pre-empt government regulation and force 
other companies to follow suit, resulting in a positive overall impact on sustainability. It seems 
that GRI has not achieved much through either institutional logic, primarily because there is not 
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enough interest from the civil society stakeholders. In addition, preempting government 
regulation carries its own risks. A fair criticism could be made that if you try to pre-empt 
government regulation by replacing it with a voluntary tool, it better be at least as effective in 
achieving sustainability objectives. Otherwise, we as a society may be worse off because of an 
even lower organizational accountability. 
 GRI popularized a multi-stakeholder process as part of sustainability reporting (Brown et 
al. 573). It is an inclusive process, unlimited in size and composition that allows participants to 
contribute their opinions about sustainability performance. GRI as an organization itself 
emphasizes this approach: its organizational structure includes 60-member Stakeholder 
Council, which is its parliamentary body; plus, it has an unlimited number of Organizational 
Stakeholders. In essence, it allows different actors to shape the GRI guidelines and sector 
supplements. GRI also put the language associated with SA, such as materiality and 
stakeholder engagement, into the vocabulary of big corporations (Brown et al. 579). GRI’s 
multi-stakeholder process is a “working model of networked knowledge management (Brown 
et al. 578). 
 Looking at the GRI guidelines more closely, Moneva et al. overviewed the three 
categories of GRI indicators: social, environmental and economic (132). The economic and 
social indicators were referred to as being of “weak sustainability” type. GRI has not included 
full-cost accounting models among its economic indicators, which could be more useful from 
the sustainability point of view. Environmental indicators are based on consumption efficiency, 
influence on biodiversity and impact minimization (Moneva et al. 132). They also exclude 
strong sustainability information, like full-cost accounting. There is also no core indicator for 
suppliers, ruling out the possibility of Life Cycle Analysis (Moneva et al. 132). GRI offers 
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criteria for verification of GRI reports: accuracy, completeness, reliability, balance and fairness 
(Brown et al. 574). Although it has been its stated aim, GRI has not succeeded in unifying the 
social reporting field around a single set of standards (Brown et al. 578). The opposite actually 
happened: there is now more competition among the frameworks for acceptance and 
legitimacy. As a result of GRI’s and other systems’ failure, reports are not easily cross-
comparable (Brown et al. 578). GRI Guidelines have three principles: transparency, 
inclusiveness and auditability. Inclusiveness requires organizations to have stakeholder 
engagement as a key ingredient for a high quality sustainability report (Moneva et al. 129). 
Auditability is based on a conventional accounting principle of verifiability. The most accepted 
assurance standard for sustainability reports is the AA1000 (AccountAbility), which focuses on 
data quality, not the sustainability of a company (Moneva et al. 129). Finally, transparency is 
the necessary component of accountability, which helps to gain stakeholder trust and improve 
the organization (Moneva et al. 128). 
 To conclude, the particular form taken by GRI reflects the power relations of the 
members of its organizational field, their ability to mobilize alliances and resources (Brown et 
al. 579). GRI’s case shows that TBL information must also have a usable format and content to 
be usable for information-based civil regulation. It also suggests that standardized, 
commodified information in itself cannot be a strong instrument for empowering social action 
or for partnerships among traditional adversaries (Brown et al. 579). It just does not have the 
visionary power to mobilize civil society for social action. Finally, there is a risk that a 
voluntary tool like GRI, which works to pre-empt government regulation, may leave society as 
a whole even further away from sustainability. 
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5. Co-operative-Focused SA System: The Consumer Co-operative 
Sustainability and Planning Scorecard (“the Scorecard”) 
 
 The Consumer Co-operative Sustainability and Planning Scorecard (“Scorecard” 
hereafter) project was piloted within a large second-tier co-operative called Co-op Atlantic. Co-
op Atlantic is based in Moncton, New Brunswick and it operates in five provinces of Eastern 
Canada (Leclerc et al. 142-143). The Scorecard has been a result of a partnership between four 
types of stakeholders: three university-based researchers, three Co-op Atlantic federation 
personnel, and forty employees and members of its local co-operatives (Leclerc et al. 145; 
Brown, Hicks and Leclerc 10, 2011). Siri Jackson-Wood is an employee at the Morell Co-op, 
which is a member of the Co-op Atlantic Federation. She will be quoted hereon as a 
practitioner of the Scorecard. In this section I will overview the Scorecard’s goals, basic 
features and the main issues associated with it. Issues include the effectiveness of it as a tool of 
accountability, selection of material issues to report, honesty in reporting, and the potential 
obstacles to implementation by co-operatives. 
 The consumer co-operatives composing the Co-op Atlantic Federation wanted to develop 
a tool that would serve their needs in terms of helping them assess their performance in relation 
to co-operative principles and values (Leclerc et al. 144). They wanted a tool to measure their 
performance that reflects their co-operative identity, to balance different types of stakeholder 
priorities (transparency and accountability), and to engage in strategic planning (Leclerc et al. 
145). Thus, the Scorecard is aimed mostly at consumer co-operatives, but can be used by other 
types as well (Jackson-Wood, E-mail). Other Scorecard’s goals include supporting operations, 
and governance; reporting on the co-operatives’ impact on the community and the 
environment; and fostering greater innovation, resiliency and sustainability (Brown, Hicks, and 
Leclerc 4). According to one Scorecard practitioner, the Scorecard can help Board of Directors 
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better understand their purpose as Directors and open new lines of communication between 
staff and management (Jackson-Wood 38:45s). Practitioner partners of the project from Co-op 
Atlantic claimed there have been managerial benefits from using the tool. There have also been 
social benefits because the process led to new community initiatives and increased 
membership, which is good for the co-operative’s economic competitiveness (Brown, Hicks, 
and Leclerc 20). 
 The Scorecard is composed of four sections/themes, including: 7 co-operative principles; 
environmental measures; economic measures; and social measures (Brown, Hicks and Leclerc 
6). In turn, each section/theme is composed of multiple Basic and Associated measures. In 
total, the tool has 143 practices and 393 indicators, grouped as such: co-operative principles (69 
practices, 183 indicators), economic measures (19 practices, 40 indicators), social measures (35 
practices, 111 indicators), and environmental measures (20 practices, 59 indicators) (Leclerc, 
Brown, and Novkovic 149). Indicators are measures of the degree to which a co-operative 
achieves a given practice (Leclerc, Brown, and Novkovic 150). This SA system allocates scores 
by sub-theme, theme and for the co-operative as a whole (Brown, Hicks and Leclerc 7). It also 
identifies “areas to celebrate” and “areas to improve.”  
 The Scorecard is substantially different from the GRI G4 guidelines in the way reporters 
using it can define material aspects, which in turn affects how they report on them. In other 
words, the two systems differ in the way their users can choose what impacts to report on and 
what to exclude. Material aspects “reflect the organization’s significant economic, 
environmental and social impacts; or substantively influence the assessments and decisions of 
stakeholders” (Global Reporting Initiative 3-4). Participating co-operatives of the Scorecard are 
asked to choose how high of a priority each aspect is, while some of them are set as “high” by 
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default, because they are considered as essential for any co-operative’s success (Jackson-Wood 
26:15s). The concept of materiality is central to GRI G4 guidelines’ reporting, where reporting 
organizations are expected to report on all material aspects. In addition, organizations are 
required to explain how they have defined their material aspects, including how stakeholder 
expectations were taken into account in the materiality assessment (Global Reporting Initiative 
7). While the Scorecard suggests organizations to consult with relevant stakeholders, it does not 
require any explanation of why a reporting organization thinks (or does not) that certain 
impacts are of high priority and worth reporting on. Following the principle of materiality when 
selecting impacts to report on seems like a more reasonable approach than the rather arbitrary 
setting of “priority” areas. 
 Just like the setting of priorities, the Scorecard allows reporting on indicators to be very 
arbitrary in the name of flexibility. It is emphasized that the Scorecard is flexible in that users 
can pick how many themes they want to report on or whether they want to use Basic practices, 
Associated practices or both, etc. (Jackson-Wood 26:49s). In order to report “in accordance” to 
GRI guidelines, organizations must choose one of two options: a) the core option requires that 
an organization reports on at least one indicator for all identified material aspects, and b) 
comprehensive option requires organizations to report on all indicators for all identified 
material aspects (Global Reporting Initiative 6). So GRI gives some leeway for reporters 
through the “core option,” but the Scorecard is infinitely flexible in this regard. It also allows 
co-operatives to choose particular theme/section of practices in cases when they are just 
starting out or do not have much time to participate (Leclerc, Brown, and Novkovic 153-154). 
The flexibility is great for co-operatives to pick areas in which they feel they need more 
development/improvement (Jackson-Wood 33:30s). But what is there to prevent co-operatives 
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from abusing the flexibility and skipping sections/aspects/indicators because they may expose 
information they would rather keep secret? In addition, picking different sections of indicators 
to report on would no longer be triple-bottom line (TBL) reporting, and be even further away 
from sustainability reporting, for reasons discussed in Section 3. Flexibility is useful for 
encouraging beginner-users; but if it is not temporary, it comes at a cost to integrity, 
transparency and accountability of reporting. Recognizing that first-time reporters may need a 
transition period, GRI also allows omitting certain disclosures, but it does not then allow these 
organizations to self-declare as reporting “in accordance” with GRI guidelines (Global 
Reporting Initiative 6). To sum up, if the tool is at least in part about accountability to 
stakeholders, whole sections of measures should not be ignored by a co-operative without a 
satisfactory explanation to the stakeholders. 
 The adoption of the Scorecard is also affected by whether it is seen as ensuring business’ 
accountability. How much is the Scorecard a tool of accountability? It is important to 
distinguish here between two matters in regards to accountability: what the authors of the tool 
suggest/intend for it to be and how it is used in practice. To start, the Scorecard’s initiators 
were three Co-op Atlantic employees (Jackson-Wood E-mail; Brown et al. 9): Cormier, 
LeBlanc, Bourque; and three academics, not the co-operative’s membership, which got 
involved in the tool’s development later on. So this managerial/accountability tool of the co-
operative came from the upper layer of the organization or outside of the it, not from the co-
operative’s membership. This, in turn, has implications for who, and for what purpose(s), are 
driving the process of SA. To be fair, the Scorecard’s developers wanted to assess and improve 
co-operatives’ performance not in a top-down fashion, but while “engaging member-owners, 
employees and other stakeholders” (Brown, Hicks, and Leclerc 4). Some of the information 
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gathered by this tool comes from surveys or other means of obtaining input from stakeholders, 
such as member/owners and employees (Brown, Hicks, and Leclerc 5). The Scorecard is 
another source of diverse information that is made available to Morell co-operative’s 
membership before each Annual General Meeting (AGM) (Jackson-Wood E-mail). 
Membership is thereby empowered to ask questions, suggest improvements and hold the co-
operative accountable based on the Scorecard’s information. It is “important to measure 
performance in areas that the co-operative and its stakeholders value” (Leclerc, Brown, and 
Hicks 153). Even in times of crisis and extreme market competition, implementing SA should 
not be seen as a distraction from “core business” matters, but as an invaluable aid to strategic 
planning and in engaging stakeholders to move the co-operative forward. According to 
Jackson-Wood, the Scorecard is a wonderful way to bring in the membership into the 
discussions and generate new suggestions for the co-operative’s improvement (Jackson-Wood 
38:43s). Asking for stakeholder input is crucial in making this a tool of accountability, but the 
purpose that this input serves is also relevant. Is this input just for management improvement 
purposes or potentially for implementing changes that stakeholders desire, which may not align 
with what the Board/management desires? When Brown (one of the tool’s developers) and 
Novkovic gave some advice on how to convince co-operative leaders to use the Scorecard, they 
suggested to basically appeal to co-operative’s self-interest (Leclerc, Brown, and Novkovic 
153), implying that stakeholder engagement is just a means to achieve that. This is similar to 
the way that big conventional businesses are motivated to implement SA tools; since SA is not 
something that is imposed from outside of them, such as through pressure from the civil society 
stakeholders, it is mostly an internal strategic decision, motivated by their own interests first 
(Cooper and Owen 80-81). While Brown and Novkovic foresee a role for the stakeholders, the 
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way that Co-op Atlantic has implemented it excludes all outside stakeholders from the process. 
According to Jackson-Wood, the results from Scorecard would be up for each co-operative 
store’s management or Board to distribute to the membership (E-mail). It would then be up to 
each store to also take any action based on the results. No outside stakeholders would see the 
results; they would not be posted publicly online (Jackson-Wood E-mail). This is a narrow 
definition of stakeholders that limits the level of accountability that Co-op Atlantic chose to be 
subject to. The co-operative’s impacts on non-member stakeholders or the natural environment 
would be a legitimate concern and interest for outside stakeholders to know about. To be fair, 
this is not necessarily an issue with the Scorecard itself, but its application. This exclusion of 
relevant outside stakeholders makes it seem as if the accountability component of the Scorecard 
is secondary, which is worrisome. Cooper and Owen argue that “producing reports does not 
necessarily enhance accountability” (in Brown and Hicks 88). While accountability to 
stakeholders is a goal of the Scorecard “on paper,” there needs to be safeguards to ensure all 
relevant stakeholders indeed receive accountability from the co-operatives’ Boards and 
management. Lacking such safeguards, the Scorecard can be easily used as a mere management 
tool, rather than an accountability tool to a full extent.   
 Ensuring data integrity of any SA tool, including that of the Scorecard, is of crucial 
importance. Unfortunately, a concern about honesty in reporting was expressed by Siri 
Jackson-Wood. When managers or the Board are filling it out (Jackson-Wood E-mail), they 
sometimes feel like they are being tested or that they are competing against other co-operatives 
in the Federation, and in turn they may respond to questions based on how they would like their 
co-operative to perform rather than how it is actually performing (Jackson-Wood 36:18s). 
Some co-operative managers were also apparently concerned that Scorecard measurements 
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might end up reflecting poorly on them and become part of their performance evaluation 
(Brown, Hicks, and Leclerc 11). Thus, they have an incentive to be not fully honest in their 
answers. Surely the Scorecard can reveal aspects of the business that inevitably shed more light 
on the managers’ or Board members’ performance as well. As a side note, this was not 
mentioned once as an obstacle to SA system implementation in my survey of Ontario’s co-
operatives. But since the Scorecard results are for internal use only (no outside stakeholders are 
given access) (Jackson-Wood E-mail), it defeats its purpose to be dishonest, because the co-
operative as a whole would not be able to learn about areas that need improvement. The 
principles of transparency and accountability would also be violated.  
 Despite the issue of limited disclosure of Scorecard by Co-op Atlantic, any efforts by co-
operative SMEs to engage with SA and the Scorecard is a laudatory step, assuming there is a 
commitment to continuous improvement and intent to be accountable to stakeholders. In other 
words, as long as shortcomings in data integrity or disclosure are based on a lack of experience 
and/or resource shortages, efforts to continuously improve its SA performance is a welcome 
movement in the positive direction. Otherwise, the Scorecard may cause more harm than good 
because stakeholders’ actions and trust are based on that performance data. Overall, the 
Scorecard has a mixed record in terms of ensuring it is a tool of accountability, but part of it is 
about how a reporting co-operative chooses to apply it. 
 
Part II: Co-operatives and The Obstacles to Implementing SA  
Systems 
 
6. Social Accounting and Co-operatives: A Better Fit? 
 The question is, are co-operatives and SA a better fit than conventional businesses and 
SA? More precisely, which pairing has a better match of objectives and practices? This section 
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will discuss this question, in addition to its implications: does the better fit (if it exists) lead to a 
broader acceptance of SA among the practitioners of that business model as a valuable 
practice?  
 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is now part of the public discourse on the impacts 
of business on the environment and society (Brown and Hicks 87). In this context, co-operative 
enterprises, which are “democratic, member-owned and –operated organizations whose 
primary goal is to meet the memberships’ economic and social needs” (MacPherson 51), seem 
to be positioned to respond to the CSR expectations well. They have a complex purpose, both 
economic and social, which is enshrined into the “Statement of Co-operative Identity,” co-
operative values, principles (Brown and Hicks 87), that in theory put them in a position to be 
more socially and environmentally responsible than for-profit, investor-owned businesses. 
Thus, profit is not the main reason of existence for most co-operatives. Co-operatives should be 
better at sharing power with the stakeholders than conventional businesses are, because they 
have more diverse objectives. However, democratic governance within co-operatives does not 
extend beyond the membership. Aside from multi-stakeholder co-operatives, other types of co-
operatives do not necessarily consider non-member interests in their decisions. SA can help co-
operatives to assess and report on how well they live up to their principles and purpose. 
Because of this wider range of commitments that they have, “the fit between SA and an 
organization’s core goals and structures is arguably closer for co-operatives than for investor-
owned corporations” (Brown and Hicks 88).  
 Despite the better fit, some people assume that co-operative principles and structure are 
enough to ensure that they are sustainable enterprises, essentially by default. By extension, the 
logic goes, co-operatives don’t need SA to demonstrate their sustainability performance. This 
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sentiment that co-operatives are socially and environmentally responsible no matter if they 
demonstrate it through SA, was expressed by 21% of my survey respondents (see Fig. 2). I am 
not claiming that everyone who takes this position base their opinion on the existence of co-
operative principles alone. Indeed, the International Co-operative Alliance for example, in its 
Blueprint for a Co-operative Decade (2013) document, has given some examples to back up the 
idea that co-operatives indeed are more sustainable forms of business than conventional firms. 
Examples include: co-operatives provide social services that conventional businesses do not, 
and they also boost social capital that leads to economic benefits (Mills and Davies 16, 18). The 
authors of the Blueprint claim that they are more efficient than investor-owned businesses if we 
consider a wider range of costs and benefits (present and future). It even referred to co-
operatives as “collective pursuits of sustainability” (Mills and Davies 17). Despite some 
evidence of their advantages in sustainability, it is not a given based on just the co-operative 
structure. In fact, many co-operative leaders and members are concerned that co-operatives can 
drift away from their principles without even being aware that they are not as democratic or 
concerned with the community as they would like to believe (Brown and Hicks 87). Co-
operatives can’t claim automatic superiority in sustainability performance, because the seven 
principles do not take all of the stakeholders into account, such as non-member individuals 
outside of the organization and the natural environment (Brown et al. 7; Brown, Hicks and 
Leclerc 7, 2011). Novkovic and Brown also think that co-operatives cannot simply assert that 
they are different (i.e. better) and expect support; in this era of growing sustainability reporting 
by businesses, it is no longer enough (Leclerc, Brown, and Novkovic 154). 
 How does the good theoretical fit between SA and co-operatives translate into the 
adoption of SA in the co-operative sector? Despite the need for evidence of the co-operative 
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sustainability advantage, and that SA is more apt for co-operatives than it is for conventional 
business, very few of them are actually reporting, as demonstrated by my survey results (refer 
to Fig. 1). The exceptions are some big co-operatives, such as The Co-operators. In addition, 
co-operatives are not part of the main drivers of developing SA initiatives, which include the 
big accounting firms, some corporations and NGOs (Herbert 24). While only a small minority 
of all businesses has adopted SA as a practice (Buhr et al. 56; Brown et al. 574), what obstacles 
are there for the rest of businesses, and in particular co-ops, in implementing it? What are the 
reasons for this lack of co-operative engagement with SA? Possible obstacles to 
implementation include high costs (Leclerc, Brown, and Novkovic 154; Brown, Hicks and 
Leclerc 6, 2011). Stakeholder engagement on its own, which is a core element of SA (Brown 
and Hicks 90), can be expensive, requiring time, money and other resources (Brown and Hicks 
93). This may be particularly problematic for SMEs, such as many co-operatives and NGOs. 
Companies that decide to do the reporting themselves find the first experience to be resource 
intensive (Brown et al. 574). Drawing on the experience of Co-op Atlantic specifically, the 
difficulty of convincing its member co-operatives of the usefulness of the tool was another 
issue that appeared, which was also present among the responses to my survey (see Fig. 2). 
Evidently, far from everyone bought into it. To further illustrate, only about 8 stores out of 80 
within the Co-op Atlantic Federation have agreed to participate in the pilot project of the 
Scorecard (Jackson-Wood E-mail; Leclerc, Brown, and Novkovic 153). A related issue 
identified by Jackson-Wood is the difficulty to convince members, staff, management and 
Directors to find time to help gather data for the Scorecard (37:06s).  
 During the development of the Scorecard at Co-op Atlantic, members of PPCs (Pilot 
Project Committees, composed of employees and members of local co-operatives of the 
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Federation (Brown, Hicks and Leclerc 10, 2011)) expressed a few concerns that could limit the 
tool’s uptake by co-operatives within the Federation (Leclerc, Brown, and Novkovic 152-153), 
or other co-operatives using similar tools. First, some perceived this tool to be too lengthy and 
burdensome, especially for co-operatives that have never used it before. Second, the tool was 
seen as “challenging to work with,” especially in sections where calculations were needed to 
summarize the performance. Third, PPCs suggested that in order to introduce and encourage 
new co-operatives to use the Scorecard, a workshop approach would be most appropriate. This 
highlights the need for close guidance in helping co-operatives implement the tool (Leclerc, 
Brown, and Novkovic 153). Fourth, the possibility that any SA system, including the 
Scorecard, is not seen by the stakeholders as ensuring data integrity can have negative 
implications for its broader take-up by other co-operatives. Ultimately, its legitimacy is based 
on the perceptions of the stakeholders who are potential users of it. Fifth, the internal buy-in of 
the Board, management, and staff into the tool plays a huge role as well. For example, the issue 
of manager dishonesty in reporting (see Section 5) demonstrates that managers are facing 
internal conflicts when going through the SA process. When they perceive that there are 
professional risks associated with SA reporting, it reduces their buy-in into the tool, which is 
potentially a powerful force against the proliferation of it across other co-operatives.  
 
7. Online Survey Results 
 The research question of my study was: Why (or why not) do co-operatives in Ontario 
implement Social Accounting? The main goal was to figure out the rates of implementation and 
obstacles to a broader implementation. There were 54 co-operative respondents of various sizes 
(see Fig. 6) and types to the online survey out of a total of more than 1,300 co-operatives that 
are incorporated in Ontario (The Ontario Co-operative Association). In theory, my survey 
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should have reached almost all of them, because the Ontario Co-operative Association has sent 
out a Newsletter with a notice about the survey to its membership and beyond. In addition, a 
notice was disseminated by the Co-operative Housing Federation of Canada (Ontario Region), 
Central 1 (an organization representing Ontario’s credit unions), Ontario’s Local Organic Food 
Co-operative Network (LOFC) and Ontario Sustainable Energy Association (OSEA). 
Furthermore, I contacted about 250 co-operatives directly through e-mail. Given the level of 
survey outreach that was done, the response rate is somewhat disappointing. Although it was 
not my goal to make any assessments based on different co-operative types, I made sure the 
survey included representation from all types: housing, financial, worker, consumer, farmer 
(producer), multi-stakeholder, daycare, renewable energy. Some of the survey questions were 
not answered by every single respondent. In those cases, I excluded “non-answers” from the 
results. The discussion will be incorporated among the questions and survey/interview results. 
Here is a complete list of the survey’s objectives: 
1. To find out why many co-operatives of Ontario do not implement Social Accounting 
systems to demonstrate their sustainability impacts. 
2. To find out how justified is a popular perception that co-operatives are more sustainable  
than capitalist corporations because of their structural differences. 
3. To see how Social Accounting systems could be adapted to better fit the nature and needs 
of co-ops, and thereby encourage more co-operatives to implement them. 
4. To understand the characteristics of the main Social Accounting systems. 
5. To determine the role that democratic participation plays in the pre-, during, and post- 
Social Accounting process in Ontario’s co-operatives. 
To elaborate on the second objective; it aims to determine how many co-operatives report on 
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sustainability indicators and then theorize about the amount of evidence there is for the claim 
about co-operatives’ sustainability advantage. The third objective is there to identify what are 
co-operatives’ needs from the SA systems, what would a SA system look like that fits the co-
operatives’ purpose and structure? Fourth goal is there to possibly identify some obstacles to 
SA implementation that arise out of the nature of the existing SA systems themselves. Also, 
this objective is there to help me learn more about SA systems in general, as part of my 
professional development. Finally, the fifth objective is there to see the extent to which the co-
operatives are democratic in their SA processes. If I find that democratic participation is there, 
it would indicate that those co-operatives are committed to one of the key objectives of SA – to 
discharge accountability to the organization’s stakeholders for the impacts that affect them. 
 
Question #2: 
Have you implemented a Social Accounting system (or at least measured some sustainability 
metrics) in your co-operative? Refer to Fig. 1 for a visual representation of the results. 
 To sum up the results to this question, the implementation rate is quite low, but the 
positive side of it is the fact that a third of respondents have considered adopting SA in their co-
operatives. This shows that many of them have heard about SA, which will encourage them to 
possibly implement it in the near future. This result does not give support to the idea that co-
operatives are inherently more sustainable enterprises than conventional businesses because 
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If you implemented it, can you provide a link to the report or the contact information of a 
person who could give access to the report? 
 Out of the five respondents who indicated that they implemented SA, I received one 
direct link to the sustainability report of the organization and one e-mail address of a person 
who could share SA information with me. Another response included an explanation how some 
sustainability data is measured internally and not shared publicly, while the greenhouse gas 
emissions data “is available on its website.” Another response indicated that the co-operative is 
conducting a “community enhancement survey,” with results not yet processed and the 
respondent is uncertain if they can be shared. 
 
Question #4:  
“If you implemented it, did you hire any kind of outside assistance to help with the process of 
Social Accounting?”  
 This question aimed to see if co-operatives lack expertise to implement SA and thus have 
to hire outside assistance. It was also aimed to reveal how much of an obstacle to SA system 
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implementation lack of in-house expertise is.  
This question applied to only five respondents who said that they implemented Social 
Accounting. Out of those five, none hired outside assistance. Because of the small number of 
respondents who implemented SA, it is difficult to conclude anything about the expertise as a 
problem to implementation. 
 
Question #5:  
“If you did not implement it, what were the reasons for it? (Check all that apply).”  
 Refer to Fig. 2 for a visual representation of responses. Among the chosen reasons, “lack 
of expertise” tops the list with 53% of non-implementing respondents. It is followed by “too 
time-consuming,” with 37%. The third most popular choice was “benefits are unclear” with 
35% of votes. Among the “Other” options that respondents wrote, majority said that SA 
concept was new to them. Other respondents mentioned that SA is not a high enough of a 
priority to do it. These results are not surprising, as time and expertise shortages were 
mentioned as obstacles previously. 
 A significant lack of understanding of SA’s benefits or the concept as a whole is 
somewhat surprising to come from so many co-operative respondents. Lack of awareness is 
also clear from the answers to Question 11. After all, co-operatives have presented themselves 
as a more sustainable form of enterprise than conventional business (Mills, Davies 14). 
“Blueprint for a Co-operative Decade” (2013), ICA’s landmark document, has argued that co-
operatives need to further demonstrate their sustainability advantages in the face of the crises of 
unsustainability of investor-owned business models. What better way to demonstrate those 
advantages than through measuring and reporting their sustainability impacts using SA 
systems? Social Accounting would also help co-operatives to show their commitment to a 
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wider range of stakeholders and non-financial objectives, such as the one enshrined in the 
seventh co-operative principle: “Concern for community” (MacPherson 47). Whether 
sustainability is co-operatives’ actual or merely desired advantage over conventional firms, SA 




Question #6:  
“If you implemented it, what were your motivations for doing so? (Check all that apply).” 
 Refer to Fig. 3 for the visual representation of the results. Out of the five respondents who 
implemented SA, “accountability to members” was the motivation for three of them, the largest 
number of votes. It was followed by “accountability to society,” which was chosen by two 
respondents. Amongst the two “Other” responses, there were: “To improve management and 
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Question #7:  
“If you implemented it, explain how did you engage your members in the Social Accounting 
process? Please provide an example(s).” 
 Of those who said they implemented SA, only two respondents answered the question. 
One respondent’s example of such engagement was a regular updating of members of the 
Sustainability Committee (composed of co-operative’s members) about the sustainability 
initiatives of the co-operative. Another respondent indicated that their members will be 
presented with SA data later on and be given an opportunity to suggest solutions to various 
problems identified in the data. 
 
Question #8:  
“Do you think there are social accounting methods/systems that can adequately account for the 
co-operative difference/advantage?”  
 The response to this question demonstrates that majority of respondents do not know 
enough about SA or SA systems to be able to tell whether there is an SA system that can 
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adequately account for the “co-operative difference”. To clarify, the “co-operative 
difference/advantage” refers to a difference of co-operatives versus conventional businesses, 
i.e. capitalist businesses. The responses and percentages are as follows (see Fig. 4): 71% of 
respondents are “not sure” if such a system exists. 23% said it exists, while 6% said it does not 
exist. 
Fig. 4.  
 
 
Question #9:  
“If you answered "Yes" to the previous question (i.e. Question 8), please specify; if you 
answered "No", please explain in the space provided below.”  
 As reflected in the responses to Question 8, most people were not sure if there is a SA 
system that adequately accounts for the “co-operative difference,” so they could not answer this 
question one way or the other. Overall, there was not a single SA system identified by 
respondents that would fit the aforementioned standard. One respondent in the “No” category 
said that co-operatives operate in the capitalist system and don’t really have a quantifiable 
difference. There was also a sentiment expressed that co-operative advantage is too integrated 
into the personal values and choices to be easily measured. Another respondent thought that 
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standardized metrics to measure the co-operative difference have not been established yet. 
Many other answers were also not to the question. 
 
Question #10:  
What aspects would you measure to determine the co-operative difference? (Check all that 
apply).  
 See Fig. 5 for the visual representation of results. This question was intended to get some 
hints of what should a co-operative-focused SA system measure or how the existing systems 
should be adapted to better fit the nature of co-operatives. I wanted to see if respondents think 
that co-operatives are different enough from conventional business that there would be specific 
aspects that should be measured in order to identify and account for the “co-operative 
difference.” Of all the options provided, “co-operation with other co-operatives” received the 
most votes – 69% (see Fig. 5). Second most popular choice was “level of transparency with its 
members,” which received 67% of votes. Of course, conventional businesses do not have 
members, who are also owners in the co-operatives’ case. Notably, no one picked “there is no 
co-operative difference,” which demonstrates a firm belief that co-operatives do something 
differently as compared to conventional business. A third most popular aspect was “Member 
participation in committee, task force or Board work”, as something worth measuring to 
identify the co-operative difference. There is no such volunteer-based committee work of 
members within corporations, so this is an obvious choice. It also illustrates that there is a 
broader stakeholder involvement in co-operatives’ governance and operations than within 
conventional business. Among the “other” answers there were: “employee volunteerism,” 
“community engagement,” “community support,” “leadership experience,” “member volunteer 
labor that helps the community,” “employee satisfaction,” “community investment and 
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sponsorship,” and “employee engagement – money or energy devoted to a social cause, quality 
of life” (when living in housing co-op).  
Fig. 5.  
 
 
Question #11:  
“What would make Social Accounting systems more attractive? (Please rank options according 
to importance).” 
Rank Response Score 
1. If the benefits of SA were clear 183 
2. If the systems included guidance on how to measure things 162 
3. If it took less time 149 
4. Lower cost 118 
5. If the systems’ metrics allowed for an easier performance comparison 
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 This question was another way to get at the obstacles to SA systems implementation. The 
way that this ranking question (above) worked was by allocating a different number of points 
for each option chosen, according to how high it was placed. Highest response would get 5 
points, and lowest-ranked response would get 1 point, on a sliding scale. As we can see from 
the highest-scoring response, many respondents do not yet understand the benefits of SA. The 
second-highest response also reflects a lack of knowledge about SA systems and how to use 
them. Time and cost (third and fourth most popular choices) constitute the practical obstacles to 
implementation.  
 This result reinforces what we found in Question 5: a lack of understanding of the 
benefits of SA, which puts into question co-operatives’ commitment to sustainability and their 
value of openness (International Co-operative Alliance). Implementing SA would be a great 
way to demonstrate both; thus, not even knowing about SA may be perceived as a sign that SA, 
and perhaps sustainability as a whole, are very low priorities for a significant number of co-
operatives in Ontario.  
 
Question #12:  
“If your co-operative implemented Social Accounting, how satisfied are you with the 
outcome?” 
 Of the 5 respondents to this question, 3 were “Satisfied” and 2 were “So so”. This 
question had a 5-point scale with options from “very unsatisfied” to “very satisfied.” The 




	   	  Ragainis	  49	  
Question #14:  
“What is the size of your co-operative in terms of sales?” 
Fig. 6.  
 
 
 With Question 14, I was aiming to identify any correlations between respondents’ size (in 
sales) and SA implementation rates. Even though very few co-operatives have adopted SA, 
they also tend to be larger ones, most likely because cost and time are not as high burdens to 
them as they are to smaller co-operatives. 
 Overall, it may be the case that the survey results show a picture that is too optimistic in 
terms of the whole Ontario co-operative population’s knowledge and implementation rates of 
SA. It is reasonable to expect that those co-operatives that did not know what SA is, or 
considered it unimportant to their business, chose to not respond to the survey request at all. 
Any self-selection on that basis would indicate that co-operatives in Ontario are even less 
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8. Interview Results 
 
I conducted six in-depth interviews in total with co-operatives of small and large sizes 
to go deeper into the obstacles of their (non)implementation of SA. The following is a list of 
seven questions that I asked each interviewee, with summarized discussion below each. 
 
Question #1: 
“Do you get information requests from your members about your co-operative's sustainability 
performance (in a broad sense, applies to every day operations)?” 
A majority of interviewees said that they do not get sustainability information requests 
from members primarily because if they have concerns about sustainability questions, they find 
their answers through informal ways, such as casual conversations with co-operative’s staff. 
Another reason for that is that members who really tend to care about sustainability questions 
are usually involved in some capacity in operations or governance of the co-operative 
themselves so they have access to any information as part of the decision-making. Overall, the 
membership of these co-operatives is not asking for formal and public reporting of 
sustainability performance data. Stakeholder disinterest in SA data is in line what I found to be 
the case among conventional businesses who conduct SA, which is much more surprising, 
because large conventional businesses generally attract the most civil society criticism of their 




“If not, why do you think sustainability and Social Accounting are not pressing issues for your 
members?” 
The most common answer among the interviewees was that members care about 
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sustainability issues but they find answers to any questions they have through other means than 
seeking that certain data is published publicly. They do that by being involved in governance 
themselves, such as in member meetings and committee work or by asking staff/Board 
members informally. Lack of member awareness about SA and sustainability issues was 
identified as one issue why there are no information requests. Another respondent mentioned 
that sustainability is an inherent part of the business, so there is little interest to have precise 
metrics about the sustainability performance. In short, members are aware of the positive 
sustainability impact and they don’t seek to quantify it in a detailed manner. Other obstacles 
mentioned were focus on the products and the financial situation of the co-operative as top 
priorities. Also, one co-operative reports on some indicators through its annual report, but in 
order to expand its reporting, it wants to make sure that the chosen measures are meaningful 
and meet the minimal standards of the members, which are high. Another respondent 
mentioned that its members are definitely interested in sustainability metrics, but they do not 
ask the co-operative for Social Accounting data. Rather, they ask for product certifications, 
such as organic and Fair Trade, which address many sustainability issues.  
To summarize the responses, compared to conventional enterprises, the co-operative 
model seems to present additional opportunities for stakeholders to learn about the 
sustainability impacts of their co-operatives, without having formal and public reporting of 
metrics. An open and democratic governance model is responsible for that. However, the issue 
of transparency and accountability may arise in cases where a co-operative is larger and thus, 
the capacity of any single stakeholder to learn about the impacts of its operations is reduced. 
Also, informal learning opportunities are limited for stakeholders that are outside of the co-
operative, so it would still have to make sustainability data available for civil society 
	   	  Ragainis	  52	  




“How do you think your co-operative is different from conventional businesses (e.g. think of 
your non-co-operative competitors) in terms of its “social” value, which includes promoting 
social good and environmental practices?”	  
This question was aimed at grasping if co-operatives think there is any difference in 
social and environmental performance between them and their conventional business 
competitors. If they don’t see any difference, then the need for SA would be no bigger than 
conventional companies would perceive it. But if (positive) differences exist, would co-
operatives not see the benefit of using SA to demonstrate their social and environmental 
advantages? In turn, would this not provide a significant market advantage for co-operatives? 
This question feeds into Question 4. Admittedly, it should not be the only motivation to use 
SA, but given the existence of advantages, it would make sense for co-operatives to seek to 
demonstrate them, take advantage of the business benefits, but also use that evidence to 
advocate for a greater societal and governmental support for their sector. 
There are two main differences in social value that were identified by most of the co-
operative respondents: democratic governance and educational opportunities. The most 
prominent difference/advantage versus traditional businesses that came to mind for most co-
operatives was the democratic governance rights of their members. An alternative governance 
model definitely adds to the “social value” that co-operatives are producing because a 
member’s right to be heard and control an organization’s effects on him/her inevitably 
improves how his/her needs are met. Co-operatives seek to involve their members in activities 
that go beyond just using a good or service. For example, the respondents from housing co-
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operatives mentioned how they encourage tenants-members to become involved in making life 
in the co-operative as fulfilling as possible through participation in governance and community 
events.  
Educational opportunities given to members by co-operatives also seem to be an 
advantage over equivalent conventional businesses. Some co-operatives provide workshops, 
even send members to conferences and bring them along for political advocacy events. Co-
operatives also allow members to learn about their operations, which is an experience that can 
lead to those members’ own initiatives. These opportunities teach members not only about co-
operatives but also grow their capacities as individuals, citizens and workers. 
In terms of promoting environmental practices, most co-operatives had some initiatives, 
such as a focus on local and organic ingredients for the products they sell, community gardens, 
and car sharing; but all of these are frequently done by conventional businesses as well. Finally, 
one of the six participants maintained that it is erroneous to assume that co-operatives are 
necessarily more sustainable than conventional businesses, especially on the environmental 
side of performance. Basically, there is nothing in the co-operative law that enforces a higher 
level of environmental stewardship. In addition, the seventh co-operative principle is not a 
binding rule, and it is also usually not interpreted as requiring extra environmental care by co-




“Do you see a need to demonstrate this difference, and if so, how might you do it?”	  
The objective of this question is to explore what are the different ways in which co-
operatives seek to provide evidence for their perceived differences/advantages over 
conventional businesses to their stakeholders. In addition, it is aimed to see whether SA is on 
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their radar as a potential strategy to do that.  
All co-operatives saw the need to demonstrate their advantage in the social value they 
provide. But one representative said that their co-operative can demonstrate it just by being 
authentic to what it is and staying true to its values. The representative implied that their work 
itself illustrates those advantages, which become obvious. But this may not be sufficient for 
stakeholders who may be looking for quantified evidence or even third party assurance. 
Admittedly, part of that evidence, supported by third party verification, is provided by organic 
or Fair-trade certifications, which are used by half of the co-operatives I interviewed.  
Social Accounting did not come up as a tool from any respondents as a means to 
quantify and demonstrate the co-operative difference/advantage. What they mentioned as a 
means by which they demonstrate their difference is through Board communications to the 
membership (e.g. newsletter), their co-operative Federation’s marketing, organizational 
websites, ongoing member education, information/orientation sessions, trainings, co-
operatives’ marketing of themselves and their goods/services. However, these are mostly 
diverse modes of communication and there was not much elaboration on whether they provide 
any evidence of the co-operative difference/advantage to stakeholders. But considering how 
few co-operatives in my survey have reported doing any SA, my suspicion is that a lot of the 
aforementioned modes of communication with stakeholders are used to describe the co-




“Do you believe your members have enough information to meaningfully participate in the co-
operative’s democratic governance? Could you give some examples?” 
Here I was trying to get at the extent of the need for SA to help inform the memberships 
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of co-operatives. Admittedly, this question would be best addressed to the recipients of the 
information – co-operative members, rather than information providers – co-operatives’ staff 
and Board of Directors. Still, the answers to this question could clarify whether members could 
benefit from additional information typically provided by SA processes.  
The vast majority (except one) of co-operatives claimed that their members have as 
much information as they want to participate in the democratic governance. A couple of co-
operatives mentioned using member surveys to identify their needs and then sharing the results 
with the membership. One worker co-operative mentioned that because of their small size, all 
of the present members are still the original founders, who have participated in every aspect of 
its operations. This gave them direct access to all the information they could ever need to 
participate in governance. Other ways in which respondent co-operatives share relevant 
information with their members: special day-long conference (video-recorded for those unable 
to attend) to discuss the state of the co-operative; explaining the budget (with a financial 
auditor present) with a question/answer session; town-hall info session; information about 
financial statements given in advance of the AGM so members can become familiar with it and 
prepare questions; board meetings completely open for members to attend; flyers and memos 
sent out to members in a timely manner explaining important matters (e.g. board elections, 
budget); and General Members’ Meetings. 
 In general, the answers provided suggest that members have enough information to 
meaningfully participate in their co-operatives’ governance. In short, there are no limits on the 
type of information they could obtain from the leadership of the co-operative. Although, 
whether the co-operative even measures certain data that could be of interest to members, is a 
separate question. 
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Question #6: 
“What kind of impact does democratic control of your co-operative make on its behavior in  
 
terms of social, environmental responsibility, and the consideration of your stakeholders?” 
 
This question was designed to determine whether there is interest among co-operatives’ 
members to move it in a certain direction vis-à-vis sustainability using the democratic 
processes. If the question is able to identify members’ desire for more sustainable operations, 
then it can be argued that there is a need for an increased adoption of Social Accounting within 
a co-operative.  
 Only two of the respondents said that because of the democratic control and members’ 
initiative, their co-operatives have gotten involved in certain social and environmental 
initiatives. Two worker co-operatives replied that it is more about the personal convictions of 
the worker-owners that have led it towards adopting sustainability initiatives. This also 
attempts to answer the question of whether the democratic nature of co-operatives is really 
what allegedly makes them more sustainable than conventional businesses. Basically, the idea 
is that if members have the power to shape the business, being members of the grassroots make 
them more sensitive to social and environmental issues, which in turn would lead them to 




“Could you expand on your reasons for implementing/not implementing Social Accounting?” 
 With this question I wanted to get additional insight on the obstacles that prevented (some 
of) the co-operatives in Ontario from implementing SA. With one exception, none of them have 
SA processes in place. The one that does also publishes most of its data internally through its 
annual reports. In short, the main reasons the interviewed co-operatives do not adopt SA are: 
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resource and time shortages; lack of awareness about sustainability issues and interest from 
members; lack of expertise by management in doing it and because there is no need (the co-
operative is small and very inclusive). Despite the lack of implementation, the answers also 




 We have seen that conventional accounting is insufficient to provide a complete picture 
of an organization’s performance to all its stakeholders and that Social Accounting offers a 
good conceptual solution to the former’s shortages. Conventional accounting, like GDP as a 
measure of national economic prosperity, excludes important inputs into production. As 
Philipsen would say, we also become what we measure, which highlights the importance of 
having good measures and appropriate standards that reflect our values. SA systems such as 
GRI and the Scorecard suffer from a variety of issues that reduce their effectiveness as 
instruments of accountability against sustainability objectives. Some of these issues are about 
the systems themselves and others about the way they are implemented. For example, not 
disclosing SA data to outside stakeholders limits the amount of accountability a co-operative is 
willing to subject itself to, which does not align with the key goal of SA. In addition, if we are 
to believe scholars like Azcarate et al., systems like GRI are very poor measures of 
sustainability and play more of a role of protecting corporate image than anything else. Perhaps 
for that reason, SA reports are not used much by businesses’ outside stakeholders for 
accountability purposes. Corporate image protection is definitely not the original aim of SA and 
the creeping corporate co-option of the tool is truly unfortunate. We have also seen that 
conceptually co-operatives tend to fit the objectives of Social Accounting better than 
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conventional businesses do. However, the rates of SA system implementation among co-
operatives in Ontario are quite low, primarily because of time, resources, awareness, and 
expertise shortages (See Fig. 2). The interviews have revealed that co-operatives, especially 
small ones, are very transparent and open to stakeholder input, which may lead some to believe 
that co-operatives do not need SA at all. However, co-operatives do not necessarily consider 
outside stakeholders or the natural environment in their operations, meaning that they can 
benefit from SA as well. Given the low SA implementation rates and a lack of awareness about 
its benefits, Ontario’s co-operatives have a long way to go in order to demonstrate 
sustainability advantages over their conventional business counterparts. As for SA itself, its 
various systems are still a work in progress with questionable reliability of the sustainability 
information they provide and a general stakeholder disempowerment in using that information 
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